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Abstract
While the relative trade-offs between sparse and
distributed representations in deep neural net-
works (DNNs) are well-studied, less is known
about how these trade-offs apply to represen-
tations of semantically-meaningful information.
Class selectivity—the variability of a unit’s re-
sponses across data classes or dimensions—is
one way of quantifying the sparsity of semantic
representations. Given recent evidence showing
that class selectivity can impair generalization,
we sought to investigate whether it also confers
robustness (or vulnerability) to perturbations of
input data. We found that mean class selectivity
predicts vulnerability to naturalistic corruptions;
networks regularized to have lower levels of class
selectivity are more robust to corruption, while
networks with higher class selectivity are more
vulnerable to corruption, as measured using Tiny
ImageNetC and CIFAR10C. In contrast, we found
that class selectivity increases robustness to mul-
tiple types of gradient-based adversarial attacks.
To examine this difference, we studied the dimen-
sionality of the change in the representation due to
perturbation, finding that decreasing class selectiv-
ity increases the dimensionality of this change for
both corruption types, but with a notably larger
increase for adversarial attacks. These results
demonstrate the causal relationship between se-
lectivity and robustness and provide new insights
into the mechanisms of this relationship.
1. Introduction
Methods for understanding deep neural networks (DNNs)
often attempt to find individual neurons or small sets of
neurons that are representative of a network’s decision
[1, 5, 7, 15, 20, 24, 32]. However, recent work has shown
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that these neurons can be irrelevant, or even detrimen-
tal to network performance, emphasizing the importance
of examining distributed representations for understand-
ing DNNs [4, 6, 19, 22]. In parallel, work on robustness
seeks to build models that are robust to perturbed inputs
[2, 3, 9, 18, 28, 29, 33]. In this work we pursue a series
of experiments investigating the causal role of class selec-
tivity1 on adversarial and corruption robustness in DNNs2.
To do so, we used a recently-developed class selectivity
regularizer [19] to directly modify the amount of class se-
lectivity learned by DNNs, and examined how this affected
the DNNs’ vulnerability to corruption and adversarial per-
turbations. Our findings are as follows:
• Decreasing class selectivity decreases vulnerability to
corruption in both ResNet18 trained on Tiny Imagenet
and ResNet20 trained on CIFAR10 across nearly all
tested corruptions.
• In contrast to its impact on naturalistic corruptions,
decreasing class selectivity increases vulnerability to
gradient-based adversarial attacks in both tested models.
• The dimensionality of activation changes caused by cor-
ruption markedly increases in early layers for both pertur-
bation types, but is larger for adversarial attacks and low-
selectivity networks. This implies that high-dimensional
representations may induce adversarial vulnerability.
Our results demonstrate that changes in the sparsity of se-
mantic representations can confer robustness to naturalistic
or adversarial perturbations, but not both simultaneously.
They also highlight the roles of class selectivity and repre-
sentational dimensionality in mediating a trade-off between
worst-case and average-case perturbation robustness. More
generally, our results encourage further investigation of the
stability and robustness of sparse vs. distributed representa-
tions, and stress the importance of verifying that improve-
ments in robustness are not zero-sum.
1Class selectivity is typically defined as how different a neu-
ron’s responses are across different classes of stimuli or data sam-
ples. Another way to conceptualize class selectivity is as a measure
of the sparsity of a network’s semantic representations.
2As articulated by Hendrycks and Dietterich [12], corruption
robustness measures a classifier’s performance on low-quality or
naturalistically-perturbed inputs, and thus is an "average-case"
measure. Adversarial robustness measures a classifier’s perfor-
mance on small, additive perturbations that are tailored to the
classifier, and thus is a "worst-case" measure.
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2. Approach
A detailed description is provided in Appendix A.1.
Models and training protocols Our experiments were
performed on ResNet18 [11] trained on Tiny ImageNet [8],
and ResNet20 [11] trained on CIFAR10 [16].
Datasets for naturalistic corruptions To evaluate ro-
bustness to naturalistic corruptions, we tested our net-
works on CIFAR10C and Tiny ImageNetC, two benchmark
datasets created for this purpose [12]. We average across
all corruption types and severities (see Appendix A.1.2 for
details) when reporting corrupted test accuracy.
Class selectivity regularization We quantify class selec-
tivity in individual units using [22]’s method. At every
ReLU, the activation in response to a single sample was
averaged across all elements of the filter map (which we
refer to as a "unit"). The class-conditional mean activation
was then calculated across data samples. We then computed:
selectivity =
µmax − µ−max
µmax + µ−max
(1)
where µmax is the largest class-conditional mean activation
and µ−max is the mean response to the remaining classes.
The selectivity index ranges from 0 to 1. A unit with identi-
cal average activity for all classes would have a selectivity
of 0, and a unit that only responds to a single class would
have a selectivity of 1.
We used [19]’s class selectivity regularizer to control the
levels of class selectivity learned by units in a network
during training. The regularizer, −αµSI , is added to the
cross-entropy loss, and comprises two terms: µSI , the net-
work selectivity, and α, the regularization scale. Network
selectivity is obtained by computing the mean selectivity
index across units in each layer, then computing the mean
across layers. Negative values of the regularization scale, α,
discourage class selectivity in individual units, while pos-
itive values promote it. The magnitude of α controls the
contribution of the network selectivity to the overall loss.
During training, class selectivity was computed for each
minibatch. For the analyses presented here, class selectivity
was computed across the entire clean test set.
Adversarial testing We tested our models’ adversarial ro-
bustness using two methods. The fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) [10] is a simple attack that computes the gradient
of the loss with respect to the input image, then scales the
image’s pixels (within some bound) in the direction that
increases the loss. The second method, projected gradient
descent (PGD) [17, 21], is an iterated version of FGSM.
Quantifying dimensionality Estimates of dimensional-
ity were obtained for each layer in a network by applying
PCA to the layer’s activation matrix for the clean test data,
counting the number of dimensions necessary to explain
90% of the variance, then dividing by the total number of
dimensions (i.e. the fraction of total dimensionality). The
same procedure was applied to compute the dimensionality
of perturbation-induced changes in representations, except
the activations for a perturbed data set were subtracted from
the corresponding clean activations prior to applying PCA.
3. Results
3.1. Class selectivity causes vulnerability to naturalistic
corruptions
To understand the relationship between semantic sparsity
and robustness, we first focused on its impact on naturalistic
corruptions of the input data. We used a recently-introduced
method ([19]; Appendix A.1.3) to modulate the amount
of class selectivity—a measure of the sparsity with which
semantic information is represented—learned by DNNs3.
We then examined how this affected performance on Tiny
ImageNetC and CIFAR10C, two benchmark datasets for
naturalistic corruptions (Approach 2).
Changing the level of class selectivity across neurons in
a network could have one of three possible effects on cor-
ruption robustness: If concentrating semantic representa-
tions into fewer neurons provides fewer potent dimensions
on which corrupted inputs can act, then increasing class
selectivity should confer networks with robustness to cor-
ruptions, while reducing class selectivity should render net-
works more vulnerable. Alternatively, if distributing seman-
tic representations across more units dilutes the changes
induced by corrupted inputs, then reducing class selectiv-
ity should reduce a network’s vulnerability to corruptions,
while increasing class selectivity should increase corrup-
tion vulnerability. Finally, if class selectivity regularization
changes representations along dimensions that are orthogo-
nal to those upon which corruptions act, we should fail to
see any relationship between a network’s class selectivity
and its robustness to naturalistic corruptions.
We found that class selectivity leads to increased vulnera-
bility to naturalistic corruptions for both Tiny ImageNetC
(Figure 1) and CIFAR10C (Figure A4). For example, de-
creasing class selectivity increases the mean test accuracy
on corrupted inputs by as much as 4% on Tiny ImageNetC
(Figure 1a). To control for the possibility that this improve-
ment was simply due to changes in clean test accuracy, we
also analyzed the ratio of corrupted to clean test accuracy,
finding qualitatively similar results (Figures 1b and A4b).
This effect was largely consistent across corruption types4.
3See Figure A1 for the effects of selectivity regularization.
4Regularizing against selectivity improves corruption robust-
ness in 12 of 15 corruption types in Tiny ImageNetC for ResNet18
(Figure 1c) and in 15 of 19 corruption types in CIFAR10C for
ResNet20 (Figure A4c) when measured using normalized test ac-
curacy, and in all corruption types in both models when measured
using absolute test accuracy (Figures A2 and A5).
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Figure 1. Reducing class selectivity confers corruption robustness. (a) Mean test accuracy across all corruptions and severities (y-axis)
as a function of class selectivity regularization scale (α; x-axis). Negative α lowers selectivity, positive α increases selectivity, and the
magnitude of α changes the strength of the effect (see Figure A1 and Appendix A.1.3). (b) Corrupted test accuracy normalized by clean
test accuracy (y-axis) as a function of α (x-axis). (c) Normalized test accuracy (y-axis) for all 15 Tiny ImageNetC corruption types at
severity = 5 (x-axis) for three example values of α. Results shown are for ResNet18 trained on Tiny ImageNet, tested on Tiny ImageNetC.
See Figure A4 for CIFAR10C results.
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Figure 2. Reducing class selectivity increases adversarial vulnerability. (a) Test accuracy (y-axis) as a function of perturbation
intensity (; x-axis) and class selectivity regularization scale (α; color) for the FGSM attack. (b) Test accuracy (y-axis) as a function of
adversarial optimization steps (x-axis) and α for the PGD attack. (c) Network stability, as measured with input-output Jacobian (y-axis) as
a function of α. All results are for ResNet18 trained on Tiny ImageNet. See Figure A7 for ResNet20 results.
Together these results demonstrate that reduced class selec-
tivity confers robustness to naturalistic corruptions, imply-
ing that distributing semantic representations across neurons
dilutes the changes induced by corrupted inputs.
3.2. Class selectivity imparts adversarial robustness
We showed that the sparsity of a network’s semantic rep-
resentations, as measured with class selectivity, is causally
related to a network’s robustness to naturalistic corruptions.
But naturalistic corruptions are an average-case measure of
a DNN’s perturbation-robustness, so a complementary ques-
tion remains unanswered: how does the sparsity of semantic
representations affect worst-case robustness? We addressed
this question by testing our class selectivity-regularized net-
works on inputs that had been adversarially-perturbed using
using one of two white-box methods (see Approach 2).
Surprisingly and unlike naturalistic corruptions, decreasing
class selectivity increases vulnerability to adversarial per-
turbation for both Tiny ImageNet and CIFAR10 (Figures 2
and A7). This result demonstrates that sparse semantic rep-
resentations are less vulnerable to adversarial perturbation
than distributed semantic representations.
To understand why sparse semantic representations are more
robust to adversarial corruptions, we analyzed each net-
work’s input-output Jacobian [13, 23, 26, 27], which is pro-
portional to its stability—a large-magnitude Jacobian means
that a small change to the network’s input will cause a large
change to its output. If class selectivity induces adversarial
robustness by increasing network stability, then networks
with lower class selectivity should have smaller Jacobians.
But if increased class selectivity induces adversarial robust-
ness through alternative mechanisms, then class selectivity
should have no effect on the Jacobian.
We found that the magnitude of the input-output Jacobian is
inversely proportional to class selectivity for both ResNet18
(Figure 2c) and ResNet20 (Figure A7c), indicating that
distributed semantic representations are more vulnerable to
adversarial perturbation because they are less stable than
sparse semantic representations.
3.3. Dimensionality in early layers predicts adversarial
vulnerability
One possible explanation for the discrepancy between class
selectivity’s impact on naturalistic and adversarial corrup-
tions is that different corruption types impact representa-
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Figure 3. Dimensionality in early layers predicts adversarial vulnerability. (a) Fraction of dimensionality (y-axis; see Section 2) as a
function of layer (x-axis). (b) Dimensionality of difference between clean and corrupted activations (y-axis) as a function of layer (x-axis)
for Tiny ImageNetC. (c) Dimensionality of difference between clean and adversarial activations (y-axis) as a function of layer (x-axis).
Results shown are for ResNet18 trained on Tiny ImageNet.
tions with varying dimensionalities. For example, if only
a few neurons are needed to change a network’s decision,
the dimensionality of the change in the representation due
to corruption might be very low, as only a few units need
to be modified. We thus measured dimensionality using a
straightforward, linear method: we applied Principal Com-
ponent Analysis (PCA) to the activation matrices of each
layer in our networks and computed the number of compo-
nents necessary to explain 90% of the variance. We first
examined the dimensionality of the representations of the
clean test data. If the sparsity of semantic representations is
reflected in dimensionality, then networks with more class
selectivity should have lower-dimensional representations
than networks with less class selectivity. Alternatively, if
high-selectivity representations are of similar dimension-
ality to low-selectivity representations—though spanning
different sub-regions of activation space—then dimension-
ality would be unaffected by class selectivity.
We found that the sparsity of a DNN’s semantic represen-
tations corresponds directly to the dimensionality of those
representations. Dimensionality is inversely proportional to
class selectivity in early ResNet18 layers (≤layer 9; Figure
3a), and across all of ResNet20 (Figure A8a), indicating
that the sparsity of a network’s semantic representations is
indeed reflected in those representations’ dimensionality.
We next examined the dimensionality of perturbation-
induced changes in representations by subtracting the per-
turbed activation matrix from the clean activation matrix
and computing the dimensionality of this "difference ma-
trix" (see Appendix A.1.5). Interestingly, we found that the
dimensionality of the changes in activations induced by both
naturalistic (Figure 3b) and adversarial perturbations (Fig-
ure 3c) was notably higher for networks with reduced class-
selectivity, again suggesting that decreasing class selectivity
leads to more semantically distributed representations.
We found that the activation changes caused by naturalistic
corruptions are higher-dimensional than the representations
of the clean data in both ResNet18 (compare Figures 3b
and 3a) and ResNet20 (Figures A8b and A8a), and that this
effect is inversely proportional to class selectivity (Figures
3b and A8b); the increase in dimensionality from natural-
istic corruptions was more pronounced in low-selectivity
networks than in high-selectivity networks. These results
indicate that class selectivity not only predicts the dimen-
sionality of a representation, but also the change in dimen-
sionality induced by a naturalistic corruption.
Notably, however, the increase in early-layer dimensionality
was much larger for adversarial corruptions than naturalistic
corruptions (Figure 3c; Figure A8c). These results indicate
that, while the changes in dimensionality induced by both
naturalistic and adversarial perturbations are proportional to
the dimensionality of the network’s representations, these
changes do not consistently project onto coding-relevant
dimensions of the representations. Indeed, the larger change
in early-layer dimensionality caused by adversarial perturba-
tions likely reflects targeted projection onto coding-relevant
dimensions and provides intuition as to why low-selectivity
networks are more susceptible to adversarial perturbations.
4. Conclusion
Our results demonstrate that changes in the sparsity of se-
mantic representations, as measured with class selectivity,
provide a trade-off between robustness to naturalistic vs.
adversarial perturbations: highly-distributed semantic repre-
sentations confer robustness to naturalistic corruptions but
result in less stable representations, causing vulnerability
to adversarial perturbations. Sparse semantic representa-
tions provide the inverse trade-off: stability and adversarial
robustness at the expense of vulnerability to naturalistic
corruptions. The sparsity of a network’s semantic repre-
sentations is also reflected in the dimensionality of its acti-
vations; low class selectivity results in higher-dimensional
representations than high class selectivity. We also found
that the dimensionality of the difference in early-layer acti-
vations between clean and perturbed samples is larger for
adversarial perturbations than for naturalistic corruptions.
More generally, our results highlight a potential trade-off
between robustness to adversarial vs. naturalistic perturba-
tions, and the roles of class selectivity and representational
dimensionality in mediating this effect.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Detailed approach
Unless otherwise noted: all experimental results were derived from the corrupted or adversarial test set with the parameters
from the epoch that achieved the highest clean validation set accuracy over the training epochs; 20 replicates with different
random seeds were run for each hyperparameter set; error bars and shaded regions denote bootstrapped 95% confidence
intervals; selectivity regularization was not applied to the final (output) layer, nor was the final layer included in any of our
analyses.
A.1.1. MODELS
All models were trained using stochastic gradient descent (SGD) with momentum = 0.9 and weight decay = 0.0001. The
maxpool layer after the first batchnorm layer in ResNet18 (see He et al. [11]) was removed because of the smaller size of
Tiny Imagenet images compared to standard ImageNet images (64x64 vs. 256x256, respectively). ResNet18 were trained
for 90 epochs with a minibatch size of 4096 samples with a learning rate of 0.1, multiplied (annealed) by 0.1 at epochs 35,
50, 65, and 80. .
ResNet20 (code modified from Idelbayev [14]) were trained for 200 epochs using a minibatch size of 256 samples and a
learning rate of 0.1, annealed by 0.1 at epochs 100 and 150.
A.1.2. DATASETS
Tiny Imagenet [8] consists of 500 training images and 50 images for each of its 200 classes. We used the validation set for
testing and created a new validation set by taking 50 images per class from the training set, selected randomly for each seed.
We split the 50k CIFAR10 training samples into a 45k sample training set and a 5k validation set, similar to our approach
with Tiny Imagenet.
All experimental results were derived from the test set with the parameters from the epoch that achieved the highest validation
set accuracy over the training epochs. 20 replicates with different random seeds were run for each hyperparameter set.
Selectivity regularization was not applied to the final (output) layer, nor was the final layer included any of our analyses.
CIFAR10C consists of a dataset in which 19 different naturalistic corruptions have been applied to the CIFAR10 test set at 5
different levels of severity. Tiny ImageNetC also has 5 levels of corruption severity, but consists of 15 corruptions.
We would like to note that Tiny ImageNetC does not use the Tiny ImageNet test data. While the two datasets were created
using the same data generation procedure—cropping and scaling images from the same 200 ImageNet classes—they differ
in the specific ImageNet images they use. It is possible that the images used to create Tiny ImageNetC are out-of-distribution
with regards to the Tiny ImageNet training data, in which case our results from testing on Tiny ImageNetC actually
underestimate the corruption robustness of our networks. The creators of Tiny ImageNetC kindly provided the clean
(uncorrupted) Tiny ImageNetC data necessary for the dimensionality analysis, which relies on matches corrupted and clean
data samples.
A.1.3. QUANTIFYING AND REGULARIZING CLASS SELECTIVITY
We use the same approach and terminology as [19]. A unit’s class selectivity index is calculated as follows: For a single
convolutional feature map (which we refer to as a "unit"), the activation in response to a single sample was averaged across
all elements of the filter map. The class-conditional mean activation (i.e. the mean activation for each class) was then
calculated across all samples in the clean test set, and we then compute:
selectivity =
µmax − µ−max
µmax + µ−max
(2)
where µmax is the largest class-conditional mean activation and µ−max is the mean response to the remaining (i.e. non-
µmax) classes. The selectivity index ranges from 0 to 1. A unit with identical average activity for all classes would have a
selectivity of 0, and a unit that only responds to a single class would have a selectivity of 1.
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We regularize for or against class selectivity by using the following loss function:
loss = −
C∑
c
yc· log(yˆc)− αµSI (3)
The left-hand term in the loss function is the traditional cross-entropy between the softmax of the output units and the true
class labels; c is the class index; C is the number of classes; yc is the true class label; yˆc is the predicted class probability.
We refer to the right-hand component of the loss function (−αµSI ) as the class selectivity regularizer. The regularizer
comprises two terms: the network selectivity, µSI :
µSI =
1
L
L∑
l
1
U
U∑
u
SIl,u (4)
where l is a convolutional layer, L is number of layers, u is a unit (i.e. feature map), U is the number of units in a given layer,
and SIu is the class selectivity index of unit u. We obtain the network selectivity by computing the selectivity index for
each unit in a layer, then computing the mean selectivity index for units within a layer, then computing the mean selectivity
index across layers. Computing the within-layer mean before computing the across-layer mean mitigates the biases induced
by the larger numbers of units in deeper layers. The regularizer’s remaining term is α, the regularizer scale. Negative values
of α discourage class selectivity in individual units, while positive values promote it. The magnitude of α controls the
contribution of the network selectivity to the overall loss. During training, the class selectivity index was computed for each
minibatch. For the analyses presented here, the class selectivity index was computed across the entire clean test set.
A.1.4. ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
For the PGD attack, we used a step size of 0.0001.
A.1.5. QUANTIFYING DIMENSIONALITY
As mentioned in Approach 2, we quantified the dimensionality of a layer’s representations by applying PCA to the layer’s
activation matrix for the clean test data (or the difference between the clean test activations and the perturbed activations)
and counting the number of dimensions necessary to explain 90% of the variance. For each perturbation type (adversarial
attack and naturalistic corruption), we chose a representative perturbation. For the adversarial attack, we chose PGD with 25
steps. For the naturalistic corruptions, we chose brightness at severity 3 for Tiny ImageNetC, and motion blur at severity 3
for CIFAR10C.
A.1.6. SOFTWARE
Experiments were conducted using PyTorch [25], analyzed using the SciPy ecosystem [30], and visualized using Seaborn
[31].
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A.2. Supplementary Results
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Figure A1. Effects of class selectivity regularization on test accuracy. (a) Test accuracy (y-axis) as a function of mean class selectivity
(x-axis) for ResNet18 trained on Tiny ImageNet. α denotes the sign and intensity of class selectivity regularization. Negative α lowers
selectivity, positive α increases selectivity,and the magnitude of α changes the strength of the effect. (b) Same as (a), but for ResNet20
trained on CIFAR10.
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Figure A2. Reduced class selectivity consistently improves corruption-robustness in ResNet18. Mean test accuracy (y-axis) for each
Tiny ImageNetC corruption (x-axis) and regularization scale (α, color). Mean is computed across all perturbation intensities.
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Figure A3. Trade-off between clean and corrupted test accuracy in ResNet18 tested on Tiny ImageNetC. Clean test accuracy (x-
axis) vs. corrupted test accuracy (y-axis) for different corruption severities (border color) and regularization scales (α, fill color). Mean is
computed across all corruption types.
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A.3. Results for ResNet20 trained on CIFAR10C
a)
               α
b)
               α








	










	




c)
     
      
  
   
  
         
      
      
       

         
            
         
    
       
        
          
   	

      
       

       
     























 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 ­
          
    α
Figure A4. Reducing class selectivity confers corruption robustness in ResNet20 trained on CIFAR10. (a) Mean test accuracy
across all corruptions and severities (y-axis) as a function of class selectivity regularization scale (α; x-axis). Negative α lowers selectivity,
positive α increases selectivity, and the magnitude of α changes the strength of the effect. (b) Corrupted test accuracy normalized by clean
test accuracy (y-axis) as a function of α (x-axis). (c) Normalized test accuracy (y-axis) for all 19 CIFAR10C corruption types (x-axis) for
three example values of α.
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Figure A5. Reduced class selectivity consistently improves corruption-robustness in ResNet20 trained on CIFAR10. Mean test
accuracy (y-axis) for each CIFAR10C corruption (x-axis) and regularization scale (α, color). Mean is computed across all perturbation
severities.
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Figure A6. Trade-off between clean and corrupted test accuracy in ResNet20 tested on CIFAR10C. Clean test accuracy (x-axis) vs.
corrupted test accuracy (y-axis) for different corruption severities (border color) and regularization scales (α, fill color). Mean is computed
across all corruption types.
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Figure A7. Reducing class selectivity increases adversarial vulnerability in ResNet20 trained on CIFAR10. (a) Test accuracy (y-
axis) as a function of perturbation intensity (; x-axis) and class selectivity regularization scale (α; color) for the FGSM attack. (b) Test
accuracy (y-axis) as a function of adversarial optimization steps (x-axis) and α for the PGD attack. (c) Network stability, as measured
with input-output Jacobian (y-axis) as a function of α.
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Figure A8. Dimensionality in early layers predicts adversarial vulnerability in ResNet20 trained on CIFAR10. (a) Fraction of
dimensionality (y-axis; see Section 2) as a function of layer (x-axis). (b) Dimensionality of difference between clean and corrupted
activations (y-axis) as a function of layer (x-axis). (c) Dimensionality of difference between clean and adversarial activations (y-axis) as a
function of layer (x-axis).
